

ハマス、そのイデオロギーと戦略と 最終目的の分析

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HAMAS : An Analysis of Ideology, Tactics and Objectives

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Modern political terrorism cannot exist without the modern media. The media disseminate the images, record the denunciations, interview the survivors and invade the privacy of those who mourn the victims. The message of the terrorist is conveyed to us, albeit imprecisely, as a result of his action. Truly, modern terrorism is “propaganda by deed” as 19th century French writer Paul Brouss coined the term.

Unfortunately, those of us in the liberal democracies who view the aftermath of the deed (or, on rare occasions, the deed in progress) hear little about its origins. Discussions of motivation, historical context or ideology make very poor copy. Political sound bites and the clichés of electronic journalism are much more likely to survive the editing process. The social or political message which costs the lives of so many innocents is lost, or worse, discarded.

HAMAS is a case in point. From 1995 to 1996 the military wing of this group waged a terror campaign unprecedented in its political efficacy. In less than twelve months they proved instrumental in bringing down the Peres government and crippling the peace process. The suicide bombings effectively neutralized moderates at all points on the political compass. Despite the savagery of these attacks and their appalling toll in human suffering, we cannot dismiss their architects with facile generalizations. As much as possible, we must put emotion aside and attempt dispassionate analyses. Yet the media have largely failed us in this regard.

The Futility of Classification

In our struggle to understand the phenomenon of modern terrorism, we take what we believe to be a systematic approach. Believing that the subject under examination must

relate to something seen before, we first attempt to categorize. Terms such as Nationalist-Separatist, Right-Wing Extremist, or Islamic Fundamentalist Extremist are common classifications for militant or terrorist groups.¹⁾

Classification of such groups customarily involves a simplistic definition of their goals. This step proves to be an enlightening ink blot test for western strategists and policy makers, and tells us much more about the speaker than the object of his discourse.

"What does HAMAS want?" Stock answers follow a predictable pattern. "...the destruction of Israel", "...the establishment of an Islamic state on the Iranian model", or "...the derailment of the peace process". These responses are easily digested by western observers and guaranteed to produce a visceral reaction in any American administration.

The answer to this question lies not in the works of Khomeini, the diatribes of the imams or even in the Koran itself. For a clear understanding of the philosophical framework which has made HAMAS such a potent force we must look to Egypt, and the dogma of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Society of Muslim Brethren

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Ismailiyya, near the Suez Canal, by Hasan al-Banna. At this time it was primarily a nationalist movement with a strong Islamic character. It directed its energies mainly against the British, with the Palace of King Farouk and Western economic and cultural influence as targets of opportunity. It was to become the prototype for Islamic movements, both Sunni and Shi'ite, throughout the Arab world.

It is important to note that al-Banna, though founder, spiritual leader and Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, was not a prolific writer. The organization faced an extremely fluid social and political situation during the period of his stewardship and he directed its activities without committing policies and doctrine to paper. This was to prove a major handicap to the group after his death.

Al-Banna was assassinated by Farouk's secret police in February, 1949. The appointment of his successor, Hasan a-Hudaybi, was an ill-conceived attempt to reach a modus vivendi with the Palace while simultaneously maintaining cohesion within the Brotherhood. What followed was a period of ideological confusion, with many writers seeking to fill the void which al-Banna's death had created, all claiming legitimacy of doctrine, none providing the guidance which was so desperately needed.

In July, 1952, Gamal abd-al Nasr, known in the West as Nasser, came to power with his Free Officers. The Brotherhood, now numbering several million members and sympa-

thizers viewed this as a positive step and, in fact, regarded Nasser as a leader who would promote their interests in the secular realm. Nasser had always been receptive to the input of the Brethren and a loose political alliance did exist between them. But the challenges facing Nasser were formidable: the restructuring of Egyptian society and leading the nation away from colonialism and into the ranks of modern twentieth century countries. Political discord, however benign, would be detrimental to his program.

Few, if any, Arab nations of the period had ever proved fertile ground for nurturing political debate and Egypt was no exception. In January of 1953, all political parties were dissolved by decree. This did not apply to the Brotherhood, since they were an association and not a party. Nonetheless, relations between the regime and the Brotherhood started deteriorating at an increasingly rapid pace. In Nasser's view, if the Brethren were to be partners they would have to be silent ones, or, at the very least, express only those opinions which would help to support his policies. The loose alliance was becoming a bitter confrontation.

In October, 1954, the Muslim Brother Mahmud 'Abd al-Latif tried to assassinate Nasser during a speech in Alexandria's Menshieh Square. The sound of the shots was broadcast nationwide on the radio. The details of the event have never been clear, but the very real possibility exists that the entire incident was staged or in some way provoked by the police. The Brotherhood has never claimed responsibility for the attempt.

The government response was rapid, brutal and, it hoped, decisive. The headquarters of the Brotherhood was burned to the ground. Government agents began a smear campaign against the organization and its leaders were imprisoned, tortured and given summary trials. Among those jailed was the editor of the Brotherhood's newspaper and one of its key leaders, Sayyid Qutb.

The Vision of Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb was to become the pre-eminent ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. His writings would also provide the doctrinal foundations for dozens of Islamic movements to follow in the remainder of the century. Unlike al-Banna, he was not a charismatic figure; nor was he an inspired orator or political strategist. He was, however, well educated in matters both secular and religious, a writer with a fiery, polemic style and, due to the horrors of Nasser's concentration camps, a martyr with impeccable credentials.

Qutb was born in 1906 in a small town in Asyut, in Middle Egypt. He was exposed to the worlds of politics and letters at an early age. His father was a local delegate of the National Party and held frequent meetings at home. Though his brief experience at the

local Koranic school was less than auspicious, he managed to memorize the Koran before his tenth birthday. Notwithstanding his religious predilections, he was an omnivorous reader.

In his mid-teens Qutb moved to the suburbs of Cairo where he lived with an uncle whose support of the Wafd party and journalistic activities sustained the political awareness that the youth had developed at home. He later began his training as an educator at the *Dar al-'Ulum* (House of Sciences), from which he graduated in 1933.

In the years which followed he earned his living as a teacher and later bureaucrat for the Ministry of Public Instruction. Concurrently, he pursued an interest in politics, publishing his opinions in the columns of the popular press, and remaining active in the Wafd party. He was also a literary critic, poet and author of many short stories and novels, several of which give us insight into his romantic disappointments and his status as a disillusioned bachelor, which he was to remain throughout his life.

In 1945, he abandoned political parties as obsolete, and shifted the focus of his writings from literature to nationalism, the political arena and the social ills of contemporary society. His articles were so impassioned that he attracted the ire of the Palace and narrowly escaped imprisonment. To get him out of the way, the Ministry sent him for an indefinite stay in the United States, ostensibly to study the U.S. education system.

As fate would have it, he was stricken with a particularly virulent case of culture shock well before his ship reached port in New York. The materialism, sexual promiscuity and alien cultural values were anathema to Qutb and he found solace in regular prayer and a rededication to Islam.

His extreme negative reaction to American society so displeased his superiors that he was forced to resign upon his return in 1951. He began his relationship with the Brethren and was formally recruited into the organization late in the year. He was forty-five years old.

His rise in the ranks was predicable for a man of his talents. He was elected to the leadership council and headed the department for the propagation of Islam. Before the rift with the Free Officers he met often with Nasser. However, in the bitter conflict with the Officers which followed and against the dissident factions within the Brotherhood, he sided strongly with Supreme Guide Hidaybi.

After the assassination attempt in October, 1954, Sayyid Qutb was arrested with the other leaders of the Brotherhood. He was subjected to extensive torture and in July, 1955, sentenced to twenty-five years hard labor after the customary show trial. In retrospect, he was relatively fortunate. Six Brothers had already gone to the gallows. He began

serving his sentence in the Tura concentration camp but because he was tubercular he spent most of his time in the infirmary, which allowed him the freedom to write. Indeed, his literary output during the period of his incarceration was prodigious, the most significant work being *Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq* ('Signposts').

Sayyid was released from prison in late 1964 on the occasion of a visit to Cairo by the Iraqi head of state. *Signposts* was published at approximately the same time and was banned almost immediately. After reading it however, Nasser instructed his censors to allow the book. After five printings in six months, it was banned again.

In August 1965, Nasser launched another offensive against the Brotherhood, announcing a 'new conspiracy'. Sayyid and several other Brothers were arrested and copies of *Signposts* were considered as incriminating evidence in the proceedings. Qutb and two others were tortured, tried and sentenced to death. They were executed on August 29, 1966².

Sayyid Qutb was clearly the most important thinker, writer, theoretician and ideologue of Islam's most influential militant organization in this century. *Signposts* was the culmination of his life's work. What was its ideological significance to the Brotherhood and the militant Islamic movements which would follow?

Signposts³⁾

This work was, first and foremost, an indictment of all secular political systems. This included Arab governments which purport to be Islamic in spirit but which employ secular legislative or judicial branches. In particular, it targets leaders who are nominally Islamic or who seek Islamic legitimacy, but in reality advance policies that are secular in character. In light of Qutb's experience in the camps, his viewpoint is understandable.

To all secular, non-Islamic societies and, indeed, to modern society in general, Qutb assigns the term *jahiliyya*.⁴⁾ This is commonly translated into English as 'ignorance'. However, the religious and social connotations of this word to Arabic speakers cannot be overstated. It is formed from the radicals j-h-l, the various derivations of which are used to convey such concepts as lack of knowledge, unawareness, foolishness, etc. In a religious context it refers to pre-Islamic times, the paganism of that period or the pre-enlightened state of those who have yet to accept Islam. When applied to a non-believer, its sense is condescending but not malicious. However, when used to describe a Muslim it implies apostasy, and is censorious in the extreme.

Qutb also makes use of the term *hakimiyya*, or sovereignty. He explains that sovereignty is God's alone and that those governments or individuals who take it upon them-

selves to make policy, legislate or create political systems independent of His authority are guilty of *jahiliyya*.⁵⁾ This applies to all political entities, individual or collective, Eastern or Western, capitalist or socialist, Muslim or non-Muslim.

This *jahiliyya*, Qutb explained, is not only an affront to God, but a threat to the very existence of the community of true believers and must be vigorously opposed by a vanguard, for whom *Signposts* was intended as a guide.

And what form is this opposition to take? Qutb gives us a detailed explanation of the term *jihad*, or holy war. The author had learned that, in the context of his struggle, the pen was patently inadequate to deal with the sword. As a result, he tells his vanguard not to limit their struggle to the use of words alone. His meaning is implicit. The 'Book' is not sufficient for a confrontation of this magnitude. It is time for the 'sword'.

This was a call to arms which not only led Qutb to his death, but left his Brethren shaken. For years to come many would attempt to interpret, dilute or discredit the essential message of *Signposts* in order to mollify the authorities, the religious scholars or factions within the Brotherhood itself. But the message endured. The secular nation-state and all its apparatuses constitute an arrogation of God's divine authority which must be fought by whatever means necessary. This is a holy struggle. Those who pursue it do God's will.

Qutb's Legacy

In October, 1981, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated while watching a military parade to commemorate the 1973 crossing of the canal and breaking of the Israeli Bar-leve Line. The assassins were members of a group called *al-Jihad*.⁶⁾

After this spectacular success (or outrage, depending on your point of view), the group and its ideas became quite well known. Their ideological underpinnings were outlined in a pamphlet called '*al-Farida al-Gha'iba*'. The title is difficult to render in English and has been translated variously as '*The Hidden Imperative*' or '*The Neglected Duty*'. Rather than try to encapsulate the author's meaning, it is significant that '*farida*' can mean a religious duty or ordinance from God. '*Gha'iba*' can mean 'hidden', 'neglected', 'invisible', or 'unseen'. Regardless of the English title it is clear that the author believes that some divine ordinance has been left undone, either through negligence or ignorance. The pamphlet was written by an electrician named 'Abd al-Salam Faraj. The contents are a stinging criticism of Islamic groups that had in any way failed to heed the very clear call to jihad. In Faraj's view, all forms of peaceful contact with the secular state had failed. Any groups which hoped to bring about an Islamic state through debate, persuasion of the masses, the formation of political parties or any other transitional strategies were per-

niciously naive. Jihad calls for fighting, confrontation and blood. The reward for the Muslim who heeds the call to duty is paradise in the next life.⁷⁾

Faraj directed much of his righteous fury to the '*ulema*' or the scholarly religious authorities, who he accused of facilitating oppression by the secular state with their lack of militancy and their peaceful, conciliatory attitudes. Naturally, Faraj's work was not well received in that quarter.

In his time, he was the *enfant terrible* of Islamic militancy. He was certainly not a religious scholar. He was often accused of picking and choosing those tidbits of Islamic doctrine that suited him and overlooking the essence, either by ignorance or by design. He lacked the doctrinal legitimacy of Sayyid Qutb, who was a leader of an established Islamic movement, a published author and had suffered for the cause years before his death. But however sophomoric his work may appear, it had an unmistakable appeal to the militants who would follow, particularly those from the refugee camps and the poor neighborhoods of the occupied territories ; those who would wage the *Intifada*. His work was an explicit call for violent action and the spilling of blood ; a jihad whose soldiers would have a secure place in paradise as martyrs for the cause.

Faraj was executed in April, 1982 for his part in Sadat's death.

The Intifada and the Birth of HAMAS

The long history of the Muslim Brotherhood, its many confrontations with secular authority, the religious and revolutionary legitimacy of its doctrine and its many martyrs had all combined to make the Brotherhood the most respected Islamicist organization in the Arab world by the 1980's. Though originally an Egyptian group, branches appeared throughout the Southwest Asia. Among these was the Syrian, which mounted a violent offensive against the regime of Hafez al-Assad in 1982. The uprising was crushed in the city of Hama by the use of armored units and heavy artillery. Thousands died.

At first glance this type of large scale martyrdom might appear consistent with the ideals outlined in *Signposts*. It is not. Sayyid Qutb explained that the vanguard of the *umma* (community of believers) should evaluate the strategic value of contact with the *jahiliyya* or withdraw from it.⁸⁾ Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, was pursuing a parallel course by avoiding direct confrontations with activist groups while keeping a careful watch on the more dangerous elements. In Egypt, the moderate factions within the Brotherhood saw nothing to be gained by provoking another crackdown like the one that followed Sadat's assassination.

This did not sit well with the Palestinian affiliates. Many splinter groups were formed

which claimed varying degrees of kinship to the Brotherhood, but which operated independently. Among these were al-*Mujamma' al-Islami* (the Islamic Gathering), led by Sheik Ahmed Yassin and *Islamic Jihad*, led by Sheik Adb al-Aziz 'Odeh. Sheik Yassin was a graduate of Cairo's prestigious Al-Azhar University where he had earned his Ph. D. and become a high ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood. In July, 1983 Jihad was involved in the death of an Israeli student in Hebron. In October, 1984 Sheik Yassin was jailed for stockpiling weapons, but released in 1986 through a prisoner exchange. At that time, Jihad began a series of actions against the Israeli military which resulted in 'Odeh's arrest and deportation to southern Lebanon.

In December, 1987 the Palestinian movement underwent a fundamental change in character. Instead of an underground conspiracy it became an insurgency of the common people, who took to the streets to confront their oppressors. Their weapons were rocks, bottles and righteous anger. This was the *intifada*.

The *intifada* brought out the best in the Palestinians and the worst in the Israeli military. International media recorded many incidents in which crowds of Palestinian men, women and children played dangerous cat-and-mouse games against well armed Israeli soldiers. At the same time, the entire world watched video replays of soldiers holding down a Palestinian teenager while their comrades attempted to break his legs. Like Gandhi's crusade, the *intifada* brought the oppressors face to face with their own brutality, thereby yielding the moral high ground to the uprising.

The name *HAMAS* first appeared shortly after the start of the *intifada*. In February 1988 a communique was issued that mentioned *HAMAS* as an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁹⁾ The timing and nature of the communique are significant in that they may indicate a move by Brotherhood leadership already in Gaza to co-opt the leadership of the *intifada* for its own broader strategic interests.

Hamas began by organizing social, religious and charitable activities in support of the *intifada* using the mosques as a bases of operation. They started building an extensive network of schools, orphanages, clinics and community centers. Their communiques turned increasingly to matters of policy, religion and criticism of the PLO's secular character and compromising stance. They called for an Islamic Palestine and *jihad* against Israel. The ideological guidance for these communiques came from Sheik Ahmed Yassin.

The PLO, no stranger to dissenting voices within its constituency, took a predictably dim view of Hamas. There were no open confrontations, but each seemed to be attempting to outflank the other in the battle for public support, mainly through calling general strikes.

Sheik Yassin was even interviewed on Israeli TV late in 1988, leading to speculation that Hamas was receiving Israeli support as a means of undermining the PLO.

Sheik Yassin was arrested with other members of the leadership in 1989 but that did not cripple the movement. The intifada and its popular appeal continued to grow and Hamas continued its supporting activities. Hamas communiques, circulars and journals continued to appear, many coming from abroad. This indicated better organized political cadres than anyone had anticipated.

In October 1990 a Jewish nationalist group committed to the rebuilding of the Temple on Temple Mount marched on the location. This place, sacred to the Jews, is also one of Islam's holiest sites. Known to Muslims as the Dome of the Rock, it is where the Prophet Mohammed ascended to heaven. On this day, a group of Hamas supporters were waiting. In the resulting confrontation, seventeen Palestinians were killed by Israeli police.¹⁰⁾

This event legitimized the position of Hamas on several levels. It illustrated the struggle of the vanguard against the *jahiliyya*. It produced martyrs who gave their lives to the cause at a holy place, and it placed the secular Palestinian leadership on the sidelines of the struggle.

In the two months following the Temple Mount incident, eight Israelis were killed by attackers associated with Hamas. In December the Israelis arrested between one thousand and fifteen hundred Palestinians with ties to the organization.

In 1991, the power of the PLO suffered a severe blow as a result of Arafat's support of Iraq in the Gulf War. Clearly, a group like Hamas with ideological ties to Sayyid Qutb would never have cast its lot with a secular leader like Saddam Hussein. After the war, Hamas began to demand greater representation in Palestinian councils. Hamas, as a legitimate political and revolutionary movement with broad popular support, was here to stay.

It was also in 1991 that the Hamas leader who had replaced Sheik Yassin, Mousa Abu Marzook, began secret talks with officials from the U.S. and other Western powers, much to the dismay of the PLO and the Israelis.¹¹⁾ The Madrid peace talks were soon to open and Hamas' support in the Occupied Territories had to be carefully evaluated. Polls had shown their support to be near forty percent. For the U.S., this was an intelligence gathering operation. For Hamas, it was a means of enhancing the legitimacy of its political wing.

Why had the political leader of Hamas entered into a dialogue with a secular government while enjoying such a high level of popular support? The vanguard had simply chosen the time and method of contact with the *jahiliyya*, outflanking its Palestinian and Israeli

opponents. This constituted an unprecedented level of political sophistication for a Palestinian Islamicist movement.

It is also significant that from 1992, the Political Bureau of Hamas, headed by Marzook, was based in the United States. Hamas' U.S. operations were essential to its fund raising activities and it continues to operate front organizations there.¹²⁾

Conversely, why had the U.S. sought out the leader of a revolutionary organization known to be conducting terror attacks against a friendly government? The answer lies in the complex and amorphous nature of the Hamas command structure. Israeli and Western intelligence analysts are as yet unable to precisely map the Hamas command structure, but they are certain that the military wing (known as the Izzel-Din Qassim Brigades; also, the Qassim Battalions) operates independently of the educational, charitable and social wings. The humanitarian activities of these branches force the Israelis, the Palestinian authority and the U.S. to be circumspect in their dealings with the political leadership.

The Qassim Brigades continued their terror attacks against civilian and military targets from February 1992 onward. These included shootings, stabbings, ambushes, car bombs, kidnap-murders and the like.¹³⁾ Many were claimed to be retaliation for specific or general acts of violence against Palestinians. The political wing, while not condemning the attacks, managed to distance itself from them.

In 1995, however, the terror attacks reached a new level of intensity with the use of individual suicide bombers against concentrated civilian targets. Death tolls mounted from the single digits to the dozens. The Israelis struck back with the usual large scale arrests and a successful assassination, that of Yehia Ayyash, a senior tactician and bomb maker in the Qassim Brigades in January, 1996.¹⁴⁾ The suicide attacks intensified in February and March. Opinions are divided over whether the spring bombing offensive was in retaliation for the Ayyash assassination or a calculated move to drive the dovish Peres government from power. Regardless, it served both purposes.

What did Hamas have to gain by forcing Peres out of office and crippling the peace process? Western policy makers continue to puzzle over this question in spite of Hamas' repeated explanation of their political goals. Hamas views the Israeli-Palestinian accord as a defeat, not a victory for the Palestinian people. Like Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Hamas believes the accord to be unworkable in its present form. Moreover, Hamas cannot accept the Palestinian Authority under Arafat as a legitimate government because of its secular character.

In spite of its proven political acumen, Hamas may have overplayed its hand in the spring

bombing campaign. On February 25 of 1996 the Israelis closed the West Bank and Gaza as a means of stopping further suicide attacks. This denied two million Palestinians entry into Israel and cost the Palestinian economy \$6 million a day. Popular support for Hamas began to disappear.¹⁵⁾

Also, the counter-offensive by Israeli and Palestinian security forces were having some successes. In addition to the death of Yehia Ayyash, the security forces managed to capture enough of the top leadership of the Qassim group to interrupt operations. In mid-March, one of the arrested operatives, Mohammed Abu Wardeh, revealed that five volunteers had been given their bombs and were at large awaiting orders.¹⁶⁾ Those bombs were never detonated.

Conclusion

Hamas seeks to further political and social objectives that have existed since the days of the Prophet Mohammed : the establishment of an Islamic nation-state whose political and social infra-structure are based on Islamic law and ethical principles. But Mohammed was [is] the Messenger of God, as the Muslim profession of faith tells us, and his legitimacy was above question. Here lies the dilemma for modern holy warriors. In the confusing mosaic of religious, political and ethnic interests that constitute the *umma* of the late twentieth century, who shall be the vanguard?

In the world of Sunni Islam, the answer must be Hamas. Though Palestinian by birth, it is pan-Arab in ancestry. Its doctrine was born in the midst of struggle, betrayal and martyrdom in the war against the *jahiliyya*. The leaders of Hamas are ideologically sound and politically astute. They, like the many young martyrs, are ready to suffer or die for the cause. Their organization, with its extensive social, educational and charitable activities, is likely to endure regardless of political developments. Hamas will live to fight another day.

The vision of Sayyid Qutb lives on.

End Notes

- 1) Shafritz, Jay M., *The Almanac of Modern Terrorism*. Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, 1991
- 2) Details of Sayyid Qutb's life can be found in Richard P. Mitchell's *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (London : Oxford University Press, 1969), Gilles Kepel's *Le Prophète et Pharaon* (Paris : Editions La Decouverte, 1984) and Yvonne V. Haddad's "Sayyid Qutb : Ideologue of Islamic Revival", in John L. Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1983)
- 3) This title may also be translated as *Signs Along the Way or Path*
- 4) Qutb, Sayyid *Ma'alim fi'l Tariq* (*Signposts*), Dar al-Shourouk, Beirut-Cairo, 1980, p. 10.
- 5) Ibid., 98-101

- 6) This group is not to be confused with Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
- 7) Jansen, Johannes J. G., *The Neglected Duty. The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East* (New York : MacMillian, 1986) , 199
- 8) *Signposts*, 12
- 9) Legrain, Jean-Francois, "The Islamic Movement and the Intifada", in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada : Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York : Praeger, 1990) , 182
- 10) Legrain, "A Defining Moment : Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism", in James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis* (Chicago : Fundamentalism Project, American Academy of Arts and Sciences)
- 11) Weaver, Mary Anne, "The Quandary", *The New Yorker* (August 19, 1996) , p. 22
- 12) Ibid
- 13) Alexander, Yonah, *Middle East Terrorism : Selected Group Profiles*, (Washington : The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994) , 26-31.
- 14) Beyer, Lisa, "Death Comes Calling", *Time* (January 15, 1996) , p. 43
- 15) A poll was conducted in mid-May by the Jerusalem Media and communications Center indicating support had dropped from 32 percent in June 1995 to 8 percent in March 1996. (L.A. Times, AP : May 15, 1996)
- 16) Beyer, "Peres' Terrible Choices", *Time* (March 18, 1996) , p. 70